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Discerning the Validity of Arbitration Agreements
Containing Heightened Judicial Review Clauses
After Hall Street Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.
Jeremy L. Zell*

INTRODUCTION

In March 2008, the United States Supreme Court held in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.' that the exclusive grounds for

vacating, modifying, or correcting arbitration awards governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) are those provided in sections 10 and 11
of the Act.2 In doing so, the Court prohibited so called "heightened

judicial review clauses," in which parties agree to subject their
arbitration award to court scrutiny on broader grounds than provided for
in the FAA.

The Court explicitly did not consider whether the now

invalid heightened judicial review clauses can be severed from the
arbitration agreements in which they sit or whether the agreements are

now invalid. Thus, the Court shed a cloud of uncertainty over the
validity of countless domestic and international arbitration agreements
governed by U.S. law. This Article seeks to clear up that uncertainty by

proposing a clear rule for judging the agreements' validity.
Part I examines the Hall Street holding, its facts, and procedural
history. 3 It also lays out the scope and nature of the problem that the

holding created. Part II examines and critiques current law regarding
the severing of invalid clauses. 4 Currently, federal courts will look to

applicable state contract law to determine whether an invalid clause may
* Associate, Advokatfirman Vinge KB in Stockholm. L.L.M. (International Commercial
Arbitration Law), Stockholm University Department of Law; J.D., University of Minnesota Law
School. The author extends his sincerest thanks to Dr. Patricia Shaughnessy (Stockholm
University), for her invaluable comments and the editorial staff of the Loyola University Chicago
Law Journal for their keen eyes and thoughtful editing of this article. Responsibility for any
errors belongs solely to the author.
1. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
3. See infra Part I (discussing Hall Street Associates, L.LC. v. Mattel, Inc.).

4. See infra Part II (examining current law in majority and minority jurisdictions regarding
severing invalid contract clauses).
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be severed from the agreement in which it sits. Under the majority
approach, a court will sever the invalid clause if doing so will not vitiate
the central purpose of the agreement. 5 The rule is widely adopted, but
most jurisdictions, with the notable exception of Texas, do not have a
clearly stated method for determining a central purpose. 6 This leads to
conclusory holdings that provide little guidance for future litigants.
Texas law, on the other hand, presents a clear method for finding an
agreement's central purpose. That is: would the parties have entered
into their agreement absent the invalid clause? 7 If they would have,
then the invalid clause can be severed. 8
Finally, Part III proposes that courts and arbitral tribunals adopt the
essence of Texas's approach, explores the benefits of adopting the rule,
and answers some potential criticisms. 9 Adopting the approach will
reduce judge and arbitrator discretion and consequently increase
predictability.
Adopting the proposed rule will also ensure the
continued effectuation of a primary principle of arbitration: that parties
0
must consent to arbitrate before being forced to arbitrate a dispute.'
Finally, the approach protects arbitration from unwanted negative public
perception by not too eagerly forcing unwilling parties into arbitration.
As a means of limiting the discretion of courts and arbitral tribunals,
Part III also proposes that courts and arbitral tribunals adopt the
rebuttable presumption. Specifically, that the parties would not have
entered into the arbitration agreement without the protection of
heightened judicial review, because the nature of a heightened judicial
review clause demonstrates that the parties specially contemplated its
protection.
Lastly, Part III addresses two ancillary issues related to the proposed
rule and rebuttable presumption. The first issue is that the proposed rule
does not conflict with the FAA's strong policy favoring arbitration. The
second issue is when an arbitration is ongoing, it is unclear whether one
should presume that the parties intended the judge or the arbitrator to
have the first say regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement.
We begin with the case itself.
5. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings and the reasoning
behind the majority approach).
6. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a clearly stated
method for determining an agreement's central purpose).
7. Rogers v. Wolfson, 763 S.w.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part MI (proposing why Texas's approach to invalid clauses should be more
widely adopted).
10. See infra note 51 (discussing consent as a foundational principle of arbitration law).
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I. HALL STREET ASSOCmTES, L.L. C. v. MATTEL, INC.

This Part examines Hall Street. Part I.A. lays out the case's facts,
procedural history, and holding. Part I.B. then explores the nature and
scope of the problem created by the invalidation of heightened judicial
review clauses.
A. The Facts, ProceduralHistory, and Holding
In 1998, Mattel, Inc. and the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality discovered trichloroethylene, a toxic chemical, in the water
supply of a manufacturing site leased by Mattel, Inc. from Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. 11 As a result of the discovery, Mattel arranged to
decontaminate the water supply and notified Hall Street that it intended
to terminate the lease. 12 In response, Hall Street initiated an action in
Oregon district court and presented two claims: first, it challenged
Mattel's attempt to vacate the property; and second, it requested that
Mattel indemnify Hall Street against the cost of cleaning the
contaminated water supply and against any future claims against Hall
Street related to the contamination. 13 Hall Street based its second claim
upon a lease provision that required Mattel to comply with all local,
state, and federal environmental laws. 14
The case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds and the
15
court bifurcated the termination issue from the indemnification issue.
After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Mattel on the termination
issue. 16 The court then ordered the parties into mediation on the
indemnification issue. 17 Mediation failed, but the parties proposed that
they arbitrate. 18 Their arbitration agreement stipulated that "It]he
United States District Court for the District of Oregon ...shall vacate,
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts
are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's
approved the
conclusions of law are erroneous." 19 The district court
20
order.
court
a
as
it
entered
and
submission agreement
11.

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v.Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).

12.
13.

Id.
Id.

14. Id. at 1401.
15. Id. at 1400.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
issue

Id.

Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989).
HallSt., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
Id. at 1400-01 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1400. The fact that the arbitration agreement was entered as a court order raised an
that the Court remanded. Id. at 1407-08. Parties can no longer incorporate heightened
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The arbitrator found that the lease did not require Mattel to indemnify
Hall Street, because neither of the conditions that could have triggered
Mattel's obligation was present. 2 1 Either Mattel must have been
responsible for the water's contamination or Mattel must have otherwise
violated an "environmental law." 22 Hall Street never claimed that
Mattel had contaminated the property's water supply, but Hall Street did
claim that Mattel had violated Oregon's Drinking Water Quality Act
(DWQA) by not testing the water as the Act required.2 3 The arbitrator,
however, found that the DWQA was not an "environmental law"
contemplated by the lease. 24 The Act's purpose was to protect
individuals from contaminated drinking water, but not to protect
25
landlords, like Hall Street, from damage to their property.
26
Consequently, the arbitrator rendered an award in Mattel's favor.
Mattel then moved, under section 9 of the FAA, that the federal
district court enter the award as a judgment. 27 Hall Street, invoking the
heightened judicial review clause, requested that the court vacate or
modify the award on the grounds that the arbitrator erred by failing to
recognize the DWQA as an environmental law. 28 The district court
held that the arbitrator committed a mistake of law and ordered the
29
arbitrator to modify the award to correct the mistake.
The arbitrator modified the award, but awarded Hall Street only
nominal damages on the grounds that Hall Street did not substantiate the
reclamation costs for the property. 30 Both parties moved for the court to
modify or vacate the award. 3 1 This time, the district court corrected the
calculated interest but otherwise upheld the award. 32 Both parties
33
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
judicial review clauses into their arbitration agreements, but the court left open the possibility for
judges to provide for heightened judicial review through case management authority independent
of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.
21. Id. at 1401; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 6.
22. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 7.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Hall St, 128 S. Ct. at 1401; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 6 (stating
that the Act was not designed to protect landowners' property from environmental

contamination).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Hall St.,
128 S. Ct. at 1401.
Brief for Respondent at 10, Hall St., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989).
HallSt., 128 S.Ct. at 1401.
Id.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 27, at 11-12.
HallSt., 128 S.Ct. at 1401.
Id.
Id.
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Mattel argued that the Ninth Circuit had invalidated the agreement's
heightened judicial review clause 3 4 when it ruled in Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services that the exclusive grounds for

vacating, modifying, or correcting an award were those under sections
10 and 11 of the FAA. 35 Hall Street argued that Kyocera was
distinguishable. 36 The Ninth Circuit, citing Kyocera, ruled in favor of
Mattel and remanded the case to the district court for entry of the
37
original award as a judgment.
On remand, the district court vacated the award solely under section
10(a)(4) of the FAA instead of the grounds in the heightened judicial
review clause. 38 Mattel appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which rejected

34. Id.
35. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1002-03 (9th Cir.
2003).
36. HallSt., 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
37. Id.
38. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 10. This finding relates to the issue that the
Supreme Court acknowledged in its holding and did not resolve. Prior to the Hall Street ruling,
some federal circuits recognized an arbitrator's "manifest disregard of the law" as a non-statutory
ground for vacating an arbitration award. See, e.g., Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 6465 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing manifest disregard of the law as "not prescribed in the statute" and
"judicially created"), overruled on other grounds by Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) ; Prestige
Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
manifest disregard of the law is a non-statutory ground for vacatur first introduced by the
Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)); Montes v. Shearman Lehman Bros.,
Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460-62 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (concluding that manifest disregard of the law can
constitute grounds to vacate an arbitration decision). Other circuits viewed manifest disregard of
the law as narrow enough to fit within the ground for vacatur found in section 10(a)(4)-"where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers .... " See, e.g., Wise v. Wachovia Sec., L.L.C., 450 F.3d
265, 268 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award). If manifest
disregard of the law is truly a non-statutory ground, then the court's holding that grounds for
vacatur are exclusive to sections 10 and 11 of the FAA would seem to put an end to the use of
manifest disregard of the law. If the opposite is true, then manifest disregard of the law can
survive, but those who use it will need to demonstrate conceptually how an arbitrator disregards
the law by exceeding her powers. The conflict was mentioned briefly during oral arguments in
Hall Street, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989), and
the Court's ruling discussed but did not decide the issue. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404 ("Maybe the
term 'manifest disregard' was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely
referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.") (citations omitted).
Shortly after the ruling in Hall Street, at least one federal court has suggested, in dicta, that an
arbitrator exceeds her powers when she manifestly disregards the law. Dealer Computer Servs.,
Inc. v. Fox Valley Ford, No. 07-15192, 2008 WL 1837229, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2008),
vacated, 2009 WL361666 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2009). Another federal district court acknowledged
the fact that Hall Street calls manifest disregard of law into question but avoided deciding the
issue by finding the award enforceable by any standard. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. NL
Indus., 553 F. Supp. 2d 733 (S.D. Tex. 2008). In June and August 2008, the First and Sixth
Circuit Courts of Appeals, respectively, found that manifest disregard of the law was a nonstatutory ground for vacatur and then vacated awards for that very reason. Kashner Davidson
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the vacatur and remanded the case to the district court for entry of the
award as a judgment. 39 Hall Street then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. The sole issue before the Court was whether the
grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitration award found in
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA were exclusive. 40 The Court explicitly
did not consider what effect invalidating the heightened judicial review
41
clause would have on the overall arbitration agreement.
When the Supreme Court considered Hall Street, six circuits were
split on the issue of whether or not parties could agree to heightened
judicial review of arbitration awards. The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits had held that heightened judicial review was permissible,
largely on the grounds that arbitration agreements should be enforced
according to their terms. 4 2 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits had held that
grounds under sections 10 and 11 of the FAA were exclusive. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that heightened judicial review clauses were
impermissible because they were tantamount to private parties using
contracts to dictate the business of the courts.4 3 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that allowing heightened judicial review impermissibly
weakens the distinction between arbitration and adjudication. 4 4 The
Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had not decided the issue,

Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 74-79 (1st Cir. 2008); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.,
No. 07-1830, 2008 WL 4899478, at *3-5 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2008). The courts neither mentioned
Hall Street nor discussed the conflicted nature of manifest disregard at any great length.
Kashner, 531 F.3d at 74-79; Coffee Beanery, 2008 WL 2838010, at *3-5. Most interestingly, in
November 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that "'manifest disregard,'
reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10
of the FAA, remains a valid ground for vacating arbitration awards." Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008). The continued use of manifest disregard
of the law after Hall Street and the apparent split in opinion regarding the nature of the doctrine
that has formed between the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits make it foreseeable that the
Supreme Court will decide to hear the issue in the near future. At the very least, the First and
Sixth Circuits should rehear the cases en banc to give the manifest disregard issue the discussion
it warrants.
39. HalSt., 128 S. Ct. at 1401 n.1.
40. Id. at 1401.
41. Id. at 1405 n.6.
42. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005),
abrogatedby Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396; Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293
(3d Cir. 2001), abrogated by Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396; Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 962261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished opinion), abrogatedby Hall
St., 128 S. Ct. 1396; Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995), abrogated by Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396; see Jacada, Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, 401 F.3d
701, 709-10 (6th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Michigan's standard for vacatur as favoring protection
of the arbitrator's authority in deciding the proper standard of vacatur).
43. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003).
44. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,936 (10th Cir. 2001).
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but the Eighth Circuit in particular expressed aversion to the idea of

heightened judicial review clauses in dicta. 45 Also, the Second Circuit
previously invalidated clauses which restricted the grounds for vacating,
modifying, or correcting awards. 4 6 The circuit split echoed a core
policy debate in arbitration law: party autonomy 47to tailor arbitration
agreements versus the finality of arbitration awards.
The Supreme Court declined to entertain this policy debate, instead

basing its holding on statutory interpretation grounds. 4 8 The Court
relied on the rule ejusdem generis-a general term in a statute that
follows a list of specific terms cannot be interpreted more broadly than
the specific terms-for the proposition that the manner in which

Congress expressed the grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting
awards was such that non-statutory grounds, if permissible, could not be
broader than those explicitly provided in the FAA.4 9 It also found that

section 9's requirement that a court "must grant" a motion to enter an
award as judgment "unless the award is modified, vacated, or corrected

as prescribed in sections 10 and 11," removed from the courts the ability
to refuse to enforce an award for reasons different than those found in
the FAA. 5 0
The ruling in Hall Street invalidates existing heightened judicial

review clauses by making the grounds for modifying, vacating, or
correcting an award exclusive to sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. The
Court left open the complicated and important question of whether

arbitration agreements containing invalid heightened judicial review
clauses are now unenforceable. As will be shown below, the scope of

this problem is significant both in the number of arbitration agreements
45. UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that
"[w]e have served notice 'that where arbitration is contemplated the courts are not equipped to
provide the same judicial review given to structured judgments defined by procedural rules and
legal principles. Parties should be aware that they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is
far different from adjudication."' (quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d
743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986))).
46. Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by
Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396.
47. Compare Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989) ("[T]he FAA's primary purpose [is] ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms."), with AIG Baker Sterling Heights, L.L.C. v. Am. MultiCinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11 th Cir. 2007) ("[Tlthe purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act [is] to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for
dispute resolution that is speedier and less costly than litigation. Because arbitration is an
alternative to litigation, judicial review of arbitration decisions is among the narrowest known to
the law.") (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
48. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1405.

966

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

affected and the amount of time that an arbitration agreement may sit
idle before the invalid heightened judicial review clause is discovered.
B. The Nature and Scope of the Problem
The issue left open by Hall Street is whether an invalid heightened
judicial review clause may be severed and the remaining arbitration
agreement enforced. This issue is significant in its nature and potential
scope. The nature of the issue is tied to the principle that party consent
51
is an invariable requirement for forming a valid arbitration agreement.
The scope of the problem includes numerous existing agreements across
the country and could take several years, if not decades, to resolve.
1. The Nature of the Problem
Hall Street raises the issue of whether an arbitration agreement
without its heightened judicial review clause is still enforceable. A
rigid rule severing the invalid clause and enforcing the remainder of the
agreement could force into arbitration parties that viewed the
heightened judicial review as an indispensible protection. On the other
hand, a rigid rule invalidating all arbitration agreements with heightened
judicial review clauses could deprive parties that view these clauses as
beneficial, but not indispensible, the fruit of hard fought and expensive
negotiations. The challenge of finding a middle ground between
arbitrary enforcement and wholesale invalidation of arbitration
agreements falls not only on the courts, but also upon arbitral tribunals,
whose authority is based on arbitration agreements with heightened
judicial review clauses.
At the heart of the problem is arbitration's primary rule that parties
must consent to arbitrate before any authority can force them to do so. 52
Prior to the ruling in Hall Street, parties that agreed to arbitrate with
heightened judicial review were entering into valid arbitration
agreements. Now that the Supreme Court invalidated one of the clauses
in their agreement, some parties can reasonably argue that their consent
only applied to arbitration with heightened judicial review and nothing
less. For these parties, Hall Street has transformed their arbitration
agreements into something wholly different than that to which they
originally consented. Courts and arbitrators cannot assume that the

51. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
("[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.").
52. Id.
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parties' consent survives the removal of heightened judicial review
clauses.
The transformation is a potentially significant one, considering the
protection that heightened judicial review offered. Heightened judicial
review was a safety net for parties reluctant to accept inflexible finality
in their arbitration award. Parties like Hall Street and Mattel that
wanted the benefits of the arbitral process but still wanted protection
from inept arbitrators, elected to grant a court the final say over
conclusions of law or fact. 53 Often, these parties have a substantial
interest in ensuring their arbitration is correctly decided. For example,
54
the dispute in Kyocera led to an award worth nearly $250 billion.
After the holding in Hall Street, parties that strongly valued the
protection provided by heightened judicial review may still find
themselves bound to arbitrate without it.
2. The Scope of the Problem
The number of arbitration agreements affected by Hall Street is
potentially quite large. Hall Street invalidated heightened judicial
review clauses that exist in federal jurisdictions that either permitted the
clauses or had not decided the issue. That means Hall Street affected
every circuit court jurisdiction except for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
It includes pre-dispute arbitration agreements; submission agreements;
arbitration agreements that have been invoked where arbitration is
pending, ongoing, or already submitted to the arbitrator for the
rendering of an award; and arbitration agreements that are currently
under review by courts.
The scope of the Hall Street problem is also significant in terms of
time. Arbitration agreements that have not been invoked could sit for
years with the invalid heightened judicial review clause unknown to the
parties. Some parties will continue fulfilling their contractual duties and
never need the arbitration agreement. Others may continue their
contractual relationship only to discover five or ten years from now that
part or potentially all of their arbitration agreement is invalid.

53. Lest the danger to parties arbitrating without heightened judicial review be overstated, it
should be noted that the parties or an agreed upon arbitration institute are typically free to choose
the arbitrators based on the arbitrator's qualifications. This is one of many ways other than
heightened judicial review that parties can protect themselves from "inept" arbitrators. That
being said, heightened judicial review did offer significant protection and, most importantly, the
parties elected for it.
54. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 995 n.14 (9th Cir.
2003).
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Courts and arbitrators must quickly establish a clear rule for handling
invalid heightened judicial review clauses. Any such rule must balance
the party consent requirement with the desire to avoid wholesale
invalidation of arbitration agreements. The starting point in developing
this rule is identifying the current legal approach to invalid clauses and
understanding its strengths and weaknesses.
II. THE SEVERABILITY OF INVALID CLAUSES UNDER CURRENT LAW

The process of determining whether a contract can be enforced by
removing an 55
invalid clause is an area of contract law known as
"severability."
This Part reviews the most common approach to
severability as it exists today. Part II.A explains that federal courts,
based on their reading of state contract law, ask whether the "central
purpose" of the agreement will be harmed by severing the offending
term. If not, then the agreement remains enforceable. Part II.B explains
that most applications of the approach do not clearly state how an
agreement's central purpose should be found. Therefore, these cases
provide minimal guidance to future litigants, courts, and arbitrators
faced with an invalid heightened judicial review clause. Finally, Part
II.C examines Texas's approach to distilling a central purpose, namely,
inquiring whether the parties would have entered into the agreement
without the invalid clause. If they would have, then the clause can be
severed.
A. The CurrentApproach to Invalid Clauses

Federal courts treat arbitration agreements regulated by the FAA like
any other form of contract and look to state contract law when
interpreting arbitration agreements. 56
Therefore, developing a
comprehensive view of the law, as it currently exists, requires
55. For the purposes of this article, the term "severability" refers solely to the process of
severing an invalid, illegal, or otherwise unenforceable provision of an agreement so as to keep
the remaining provisions enforceable. The term as it is used in this article is not to be confused
with the strictly arbitration law principle of "severability," which states that an arbitration
agreement is conceptually separate from the contract in which it is found and, consequently,
attacks on the overall contract's validity do not affect the arbitration agreement's validity. See
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967) (discussing how the
First Circuit interprets severability issues involving arbitration agreements). Internationally,
severability in the strictly arbitration sense is also known as "separability," and the arbitration is
often said to be independent or autonomous. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 192-93 (1994); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

198-204 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,

1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN].

56. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1001 (citing Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1210
(9th Cir. 1998)).
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examining both federal and state common law related to the topic of
severability. Federal and state courts ask whether the invalid clauses
can be severed from an agreement without vitiating the central purpose
of the agreement. Under Texas law, an agreement's central purpose is
found by deciding "whether [the parties] would have entered into the
agreement absent the illegal parts." 5 7 The majority of jurisdictions,
however, do not implement as clear a method for finding an
agreement's central purpose. These courts investigate the extent to
which the valid and invalid clauses in the agreement are interwoven
with one another.5 8 If the invalid clause is independent from the valid
clauses, then severing the clause does not harm the agreement's central
purpose. If the valid and invalid clauses are interwoven and removal of
the invalid clause would prevent the agreement's effectuation, then the
entire agreement is invalid.
In addition to looking at the
interconnectedness of the valid and invalid clauses, California courts
also inquire into whether severing the invalid clause serves the
59
"interests of justice."
The Ninth Circuit used both inquiries when it severed the invalid
heightened judicial review clause in Kyocera.60
The court first
considered the interconnectedness of the valid and invalid clauses, and
then considered whether severing the clause would further the interests
of justice. 6 1 On the first issue, the court held that the clause could be
severed, because the invalidity of the heightened judicial review
provisions did not "permeate any other portion of the arbitration clause,

57. Rogers v. Wolfson, 763 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).

58. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. lAG Int'l Acceptance Group, 28 F. Supp. 2d 126, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("New York courts often enforce legal components of an agreement where the
illegal aspects are incidental to the legal aspects and are not the main objective of the agreement."
(quoting Artache v. Goldin, 133 A.D.2d 596, 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)) (internal quotations
omitted); McCall v. Frampton, 81 A.D.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (finding that the test

for severance in New York "is the degree to which the illegality infects and destroys the
agreement"); Harbour v. Arelco, Inc., 678 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. 1997) ("[If a contract contains
an illegal provision which can be eliminated without frustrating the basic purpose of the contract,
the court will enforce the remainder of the contract." (citing Corner v. Mills, 650 N.E.2d 712, 715
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995))); Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 285 (4th

Cir. 1974) ("Generally, when a contract covers several subjects, some of whose provisions are
valid and some void, those which are valid will be upheld if they are not so interwoven with those
illegal as to make divisibility impossible." (citing Bristol v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 149 S.E. 632,
644 (Va. 1929))); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521, 531-32 (N.C. 1973) ("When a

contract contains provisions which are severable from an illegal provision and are in no way
dependent upon the enforcement of the illegal provision for their validity, such provisions may be
enforced." (citing In re Port Publ'g Co., 57 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 1950))).

59. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 699 (Cal. 2000).
60.
61.

Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1001-02.
Id. at 1000-01.
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and the [heightened judicial] review provisions are not interdependent
with any other." 62 On the second issue, the court held that the interests
of justice required it to sever the invalid heightened judicial review
clause and leave the rest of the arbitration agreement intact.6 3 It based
this holding on the fact that the dispute had been in front of courts and
arbitral tribunals for fifteen years, the award had been rendered, and
invalidating the entire agreement would render worthless all of the time
and money the parties had invested in resolving the dispute. 64 If the
entire arbitration agreement had been vitiated, the original prevailing
party would have been forced to start all over in prosecuting its claims,
thereby conferring a disproportional benefit to the party that lost the
65
original arbitration.
In addition to asking whether an invalid clause strikes at the primary
purpose of a contract, California courts also ask whether enforcing the
contract without the clause serves justice. In Oakland-Alameda County
Coliseum Authority v. CC Partners, the California Court of Appeals
held that enforcing an entire arbitration agreement without its
heightened judicial review clause would serve justice by not allowing
one party to benefit over the other.6 6 The court seemed to conflate the
concept of the interest of justice with the concept of public policy by
using the terms interchangeably. 6 7 The court found that "[t]he interests
of justice and the policy of this state to encourage the arbitration of
disputes would be ill served by a ruling that would render this
arbitration award unenforceable." 6 8 Thus, the court implied that when
considering whether invalidating an agreement would serve the interests
of justice, California courts must consider the state's pro-arbitration
public policy. In Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., the
California Court of Appeals again equated public policy interests with
interests of justice when stating that interests of justice would not be

62. Id. at 1001-02.
63. Id. at 1002.
64. Id. Although not expressed by the court, one could justify the holding in terms of
estoppel. One could argue that Kyocera willingly arbitrated for fifteen years and then challenged
the validity of the arbitration clause; therefore, it should be bound by the performance of its
obligation to arbitrate. On the other hand, the validity of the arbitration clause was not at issue
until nearly fifteen years into the dispute when the Ninth Circuit invalidated heightened judicial
review clauses after raising and deciding the issue sua sponte. Id. at 1004 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1002 (majority opinion).
66. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners, 101 Cal. App. 4th 635, 647
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002), overruled by Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. 190 P.3d 586 (Cal.
2008).
67. CCPartners,101 Cal. App. 4th at 647.
68. Id.
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served by ignoring California's and the FAA's pro-arbitration policies
69
and invalidating an entire arbitration agreement.
Kyocera defined the interests of justice as preventing one party from
unfairly gaining an advantage over another and focused its analysis on
the current state of the parties after fifteen years of arbitration and
litigation. CC Partners and Cable Connection defined the interests of
justice similarly, but also used the idea synonymously with a proarbitration policy.
B. Weaknesses of the Current Approach
The approach to severability taken by most courts suffers from one
major flaw: it has no clearly stated method for identifying the central
purpose of an agreement. Thus, it leaves far too much discretion in the
hands of those interpreting the agreement and makes it difficult for
future litigants to predict how a court or arbitrator will rule in their
particular case. The uncertainty is magnified when the even more
nebulous concept of "the interests of justice" is added to the inquiry.
This excerpt from Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Associates
serves as a good example of courts' all too common approach to the
issue of severability:
Generally when a contract covers several subjects, some of whose
provisions are valid and some void, those which are valid will be
upheld if they are not so interwoven with those illegal as to make
divisibility impossible. Here, the excessively broad covenant not to
compete is ancillary to an otherwise valid contract of employment
between [the parties]. But . . . the principle consideration for the
covenant[] is so interwoven with the void portion of the agreement as
to be unenforceable. Consequently [theyrevailing party] is under no
obligation to make severance payments.7
The court stated that invalid terms can be severed if they are not
interwoven with valid terms. It then found one clause to be "ancillary"
to an employment contract, but another too interwoven with the void
69. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that "[invalidating the entire agreement] would ill serve the interest[s] of justice and the
policy of this state [and of the FAA] to encourage arbitration of disputes"), rev'd 109 P.3d 586
(Cal. 2008). The California Court of Appeals held that heightened judicial review was
unenforceable under both the FAA and the California Arbitration Act and severed the clause. id.
at 206. The California Supreme Court later reversed the holding (as well as the holding in CC
Partners) and found that heightened judicial review is permissible under the California
Arbitration Act. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d 586. Regardless of the California Supreme Court's
disposition of the case, Cable Connection and CC Partners stand as good examples of how
California courts apply severability analysis.
70. Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 1974)
(citations omitted).
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provision to be enforced. What the court did not do is explain what
constitutes an interwoven provision and at what point a provision
becomes too interwoven to survive. Likewise, the court did not explain
what makes a provision ancillary.
Consider this excerpt from Harbourv. Arelco, Inc.:

Generally a contract made in violation of a statute is void. However,
if [the] contract contains an illegal provision which can be eliminated
without frustrating the basic purpose of the contract, the court will
enforce the remainder of the contract. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the primary purpose of the contract is not frustrated by
the elimination of the [invalid clause]. If the contract had conformed
with the statutory requirements, the inclusion of the [invalid clause]
71
alone would not have rendered the entire contract unenforceable.
Here the Indiana Supreme Court stated that invalid terms can be
severed if doing so does not harm the contract's basic purpose. As in
Alston Studios, the court did not attempt to specify what the basic
purpose was when it drew the conclusion that it had not been harmed.
Finally, the last sentence of the court's reasoning is simply a
restatement of the rule. The court's reasoning comes full circle: the
agreement is enforceable without the invalid clause, because the
original inclusion of the invalid clause did not render the agreement
unenforceable.
Without a clear method for finding an agreement's central purpose,
two possible methods may be used to understand the holdings. The fact
that "purpose" is used in its singular form may imply that every
agreement has at its heart one singular, essential term that exemplifies
the central purpose. Alternatively, the phrase may imply that every
agreement's central purpose may be captured by one statement that
summarizes the agreement.
Seeking out a central term is problematic because many agreements
include a large variety of terms or clauses, with one just as important as
the next. Consider this hypothetical example: A, a sporting goods
chain, contracts to buy 100,000 cases of baseballs from B, a sporting
goods manufacturer, at a price of $25 per case. The cases will be
delivered in three installments. The first installment of 35,000 cases
will occur immediately; the second installment of 35,000 cases will
occur three months after the first; and the last installment of 30,000
cases will occur three months after the second. A will pay B the value
of the delivery after each delivery. Finally, B agrees to pay the cost of

71.

Harbour v. Arelco, Inc., 678 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. 1997) (citations omitted).
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shipping and to insure the safety of the cases until they are delivered to
A. The shipping costs are estimated at around $65,000.
The agreement has a descriptive term (the goods being purchased are
baseballs), a price term ($25 per case), a quantity term (100,000 cases),
a delivery term (three installments of 35,000, 35,000, and 30,000; B
pays costs), and an insurance term (B bears the risk of loss prior to
delivery).
If the central purpose of an agreement is a singular and essential
term, then a fatal problem immediately surfaces: is the price term, the
quantity term, or the term describing the goods the essential term? If
the price term is the essential term, then a court that hypothetically
found either of the other two terms to be invalid could enforce B's
attempt to deliver tennis rackets instead of baseballs or its attempt to
deliver only a fraction of the order. If the goods' description is the
essential term, then a court that hypothetically found one of the other
terms unenforceable could enforce A's attempt to pay half the price or
demand twice the quantity. It is doubtful that a court would take
severability so far.
Perhaps courts will attempt to capture an agreement's central purpose
through a concise statement that captures the essence of the agreement.
This approach is also problematic. The central purpose of the above
agreement could be stated as a contract for sale. Of course, it is more
than just a contract for the sale of anything; A is buying baseballs, not
tennis rackets. So, the agreement may be better stated as a contract for
the sale of baseballs. There is a reason, though, that A and B agreed
upon a delivery schedule. A may not have the space to store all 100,000
cases at once or may not have the ability to pay the entire purchase price
in one installment. B may not have the manufacturing capacity to fulfill
a 100,000-case order and still service its other customers. In that sense,
the delivery schedule could be viewed as essential to the agreement.
Therefore, the agreement should be stated as a contract for sale of
baseballs, with delivery to occur in three phases, and payment after each
delivery. Finally, A and B agreed that B should insure the safety of the
goods until delivery. A may be unable to self-insure or purchase
separate insurance for the goods. B may use bearing the risk of loss as a
carrot for attracting customers, There could be an infinite number of
reasons why the parties put the risk on B; the important thing is that
they did. If the successful conclusion of an agreement was contingent
on B's willingness to bear the risk of loss, then in that sense the term is
essential to the agreement. The agreement should then be stated as a
contract for the sale of baseballs, with delivery to occur in three phases,
payment after each delivery, and B bears the risks of loss prior to
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delivery. Without a clear method for finding an agreement's central
purpose, a judge or arbitrator could choose any of the above examples
as the agreement's central purpose based solely on her discretion.
When it comes to arbitration agreements, courts tend to find that the
central purpose of the arbitration agreement is upheld so long as the
parties are allowed to arbitrate in one sense or another. 72 This view
demonstrates a lack of appreciation for what it means to arbitrate and
permits courts and arbitral tribunals the opportunity to undervalue or
outright ignore key provisions in carefully drafted and complex
arbitration agreements. Arbitration agreements often prescribe, among
numerous other things, the number of arbitral tribunals, the arbitrator
selection process, the law governing the substance and procedure of the
arbitration, division of responsibilities between arbitral tribunals and the
73
courts, and institutional rules that govern all of the above.
Theoretically, one or more of those provisions could be removed
without denying the parties the opportunity to arbitrate in the most
minimal sense. Doing that, however, could significantly change what
the parties had in mind when they agreed to arbitrate. An approach to
severing invalid heightened review clauses-and other defective
clauses-must provide a clear method for determining the importance
of the provision to the essence of the arbitration agreement as the parties
imagined it. The approach used by most jurisdictions relies too heavily
on the court's or arbitral tribunal's discretion.
Any given agreement, whether for a sale or an arbitration, is more
than just a singular term or clause. An agreement, at least among
parties with similar bargaining power, 74 is the final product of the
parties' negotiations and is the most accurate representation of what the
parties desired and what they were willing to give up to obtain it. Some
terms in an agreement may be the subject of heated discussion; others
may be thrown in at the eleventh hour. It is impossible for any outside

72. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
73. BORN, supra note 55, at 4-5, 9-10.
74. In the United States, legal commentators, journalists, and others in the public have voiced
concerns regarding the use of form contracts to bind consumers to arbitrate claims arising out of
everyday purchases, such as wireless phones, home computers, and televisions. The same
concern extends to arbitration agreements in employment contracts. For a discussion of the role
of bargaining power in the formation of consent to arbitrate, see, for example, Colin J. Daniels,
Note, Mandatory Arbitration: How Private Actors Can Improve Their Footing on Unstable
Ground, 12 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 525 (2007); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and
Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers' Informed Consent to Arbitration
Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 275 (1999); and Richard E. Speidel,
Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its
Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998).
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party, including courts and arbitral tribunals, to meaningfully
understand the central purpose of that bargain without understanding the
importance that each party places on the given terms.
C. A PassingReference to Party Intent Is Insufficient
Some jurisdictions, not including Texas, reference party intent when
deciding if severing an invalid clause would harm an agreement's
central purpose. These jurisdictions, however, are not clear as to how
party intent should interact with an agreement's central purpose. This is
problematic for two reasons. First, jurisdictions that do not draw a clear
link between party intent and an agreement's central purpose may
invoke the same conclusory, overly discretionary reasoning as
jurisdictions that make no reference to party intent. Second, case law
that only cursorily references party intent as a means of finding an
agreement's central purpose may lose all reference to party intent as it
develops.
1. Failing to Clearly Link Party Intent and Central Purpose Diminishes
Party Intent's Usefulness
Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. serves as a good
example of how a court's improper treatment of party intent diminished
its usefulness. 75 In Ignazio, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether an invalid heightened judicial review clause should
void the arbitration agreement in which it sat. Under Ohio law, whether
or not an invalid clause in an agreement may be severed "depends on
the intention of the parties, and this must be ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction." 76 The court found that the parties intended the
invalid clause to be severable, because their agreement explicitly stated
that any unenforceable clauses should be severed and the remaining
clauses be given effect. 77 The court could have rested its decision
solely on the parties' intent, but instead based its decision partially on
its belief that severance would not materially change the requirement to
arbitrate, the process of requesting arbitration, the process of conducting
arbitration, and the means of enforcing an award.7 8 Additionally, the

75. Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broadf, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ohio 2007).
76. Id. at 20 (quoting Huntington & Finke Co. v. Lake Erie Lumber & Supply Co., 143 N.E.
132 (Ohio 1924)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 21. The court stated:
Severing only the second sentence of Section 10B will not modify or alter the
remainder of the provision for enforcing an arbitration award. The agreement still
requires the parties to arbitrate disputes. Severing does not modify or change the terms
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court stated that severing a "single phrase in one sentence in a multipage agreement [did] not alter the fundamental nature of the
'79
agreement" and that the "essence of the agreement remain[ed]."
When parties explicitly state that they want invalid clauses to be
severed so that the remainder of the agreement may survive, it is not

difficult for a court or arbitrator to give effect to parties' intent and
sever the invalid clause. 80 That is the easy case. The hard case arises

when the parties do not express their intent. Therefore, it is unclear how
Ohio would effectuate party intent in the hard case.

In Ignazio, the

court fell into the same pitfalls as courts that do not reference the intent
of the parties. First, its findings regarding the central purpose of the
agreement were conclusory. The court failed to explain how or why the

requirement to arbitrate and the processes for requesting arbitration,
conducting the arbitration, and enforcing an award comprised the
arbitration agreement's central purpose and, more importantly, failed to
81
adequately explain why heightened judicial review did not.

Second, the court seemed to rely heavily on the size of the heightened
judicial review clause in relation to the size of the rest of the agreement.
In the court's view, the fact that the heightened judicial review clause

was a single phrase in a single sentence in a very large agreement must
of the agreement for demanding and conducting the arbitration process. The
agreement continues to provide a means of enforcement in that "[e]ither party may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to compel arbitration under this
Agreement and to enforce an arbitration award."
Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added). The contract at issue in Ignazio contained a so-called savings
clause, which provided that "[s]hould any provision of this Agreement be found to be
unenforceable, such portion shall be severed from the Agreement and the remaining portions shall
remain in full force and effect." Id. at 20. The court, for obvious reasons, found this language
instructive when it determined that the heightened judicial review clause did not alter the central
purpose of the agreement and severance would not offend the intent of the parties. Id. at 21.
80. This Article does not take a stand on the issue of whether a savings clause should be
dispositive on the severance issue. If the judge or arbitrator took a strictly objective approach to
determine party intent and examined only the plain meaning of the agreement's text, then a
savings clause would likely be dispositive. If the judge or arbitrator took a more subjective
approach and extended her inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the formation of the
agreement, then a pro forma savings clause may provide less evidence of the parties' true intent.
Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the objective and subjective approaches to
understanding party intent is beyond the scope of this Article. Under either approach, explicit
language would likely make deciding the issue substantially easier.
81. Ignazio, 865 N.E.2d at 21 ("Severing only the second sentence of Section 10B will not
modify or alter the remainder of the provision for enforcing an arbitration award. The agreement
still requires the parties to arbitrate disputes. Severing does not modify or change the terms of the
agreement for demanding and conducting the arbitration process. The agreement continues to
provide a means of enforcement in that '[e]ither party may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction to compel arbitration under this Agreement and to enforce an arbitration
award.').

2009] Arbitration Agreements and Heightened Judicial Review

977

make it expendable. 82 This is an unfortunate view, however, because
the size of a provision compared to the complete agreement says little
about the importance of that provision or its connection to the
For example, eliminating a single
agreement's central purpose.
sentence that states, "The parties agree to arbitrate disputes arising out
of this contract," could doom an arbitration agreement regardless of its
size or complexity. 8 3 Stating clearly how party intent should be used to
find a contract's central purpose eliminates such conclusory reasoning
and helps a court or arbitrator effectuate party intent in the hard case.
2. If Party Intent Is Not Paramount to an Inquiry, It May Be Lost
Altogether
California's severability analysis initially looked to the intent of the
parties to find an agreement's central purpose, but that inquiry silently
disappeared. When the California Supreme Court decided Amendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. in 2000, it applied a
severability analysis to unconscionable clauses in an arbitration
84
agreement and held that the clauses invalidated the entire agreement.
In its analysis, the court first acknowledged the importance of the intent
of the parties by stating that "[w]hether a contract is entire or severable
. . . [is a question of] construction to be determined by the court
according to the intention of the parties." 85 But then after a discussion
of case law and the policies behind severing invalid clauses (including
interests of justice), the court stated that "[c]ourts are to look to the
various purposes of the contract." 86 According to the court, "[i]f the
central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the
contract as a whole cannot be enforced. '87 Ultimately, the court based
its decision primarily on its belief that the unconscionable and
conscionable provisions were too interwoven to permit severability. 88 It
did not rest its decision on the intention of the parties in any discernable
way. 89 The court's reasoning was very similar to the reasoning in
82. Id. at 20-21.
83. See JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 167-68 (2003) (explaining the essential
ingredients of an arbitration agreement).
84. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 699 (Cal. 2000).
85. Id. at 695 (quoting Keene v. Harling, 392 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1964)).
86. Id. at 695-96.

87. Id. at 696.
88. Id. at 696-97 ("The arbitration agreement contains more than one unlawful provision
... . [Tihere is no single provision a court can strike or restrict in order to remove the
unconscionable taint from the agreement.").
89. See id. at 695-99 (stating the two factors the court weighed against severance of the
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Ignazio. Thus, the courts referred to the intent of the parties in passing,
but then rested their decisions on conclusory statements regarding the
90
interwoven character, or lack thereof, of the agreement's provisions.
Following Armendariz, California courts applying severability
analysis refrained from referencing party intent at all. In Little v. Auto
Stiegler, Inc., the California Supreme Court considered, among other
things, whether a provision in an employment related arbitration
agreement allowing either party to appeal an arbitration award to a
second arbitrator was unconscionable, and if it was, whether the
unconscionable provision could be severed and the remaining
arbitration agreement enforced. 9 1
After finding the provision
unconscionable, the court began its severability analysis by citing
Armendariz for the proposition that the two purposes for severing illegal
provisions are first, to prevent one party from gaining an undeserved
benefit, and second, to preserve contractual relationships without
condoning an illegal scheme. 92
The court also stated that the
overarching inquiry was whether severing an unenforceable provision
would further the interests of justice and noted that severance was
permissible if the central purpose of the agreement was not tainted with
illegality. 9 3 What the court did not carry over from Armendariz was any
mention of party intent. The court held that the unconscionable appeal
provision was not too interwoven with the remaining provisions and
94
that severance was appropriate.
Any hope of infusing an "intent-of-the-parties" approach back into
California severance analysis was greatly diminished when the Ninth
Circuit rested its holding in Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Services, Inc., that the heightened judicial review clause involved was
severable, primarily upon the reasoning in Little. 95 The Kyocera court
determined that the clause was severable because it did not taint the
central purpose of the agreement and the interest of justice demanded

unlawful provision).
90. Compare id. at 696-97 (concluding that an arbitration agreement which cannot be cured
by severance and is permeated by unconscionability must be rescinded), with Ignazio v. Clear
Channel Broad., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 18, 21-22 (Ohio 2007) (noting the parties' intent to arbitrate
but ultimately holding the provision was severed because it was not an essential term of the
arbitration agreement).
91. Little v. Auto Stielger, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 981 (Cal. 2003).
92. Id. at 985.
93. Id. at 985-86.
94. Id. at 986-87.
95. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1001-02 (9th Cir.
2003).
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severance. 96 Thus, any reference to intent of the parties has been
completely jettisoned from California severance case law.
In summary, as demonstrated by Ignazio as well as Armendariz and
its progeny, the intent of the parties must have more than just a passive
role in deciding whether an invalid clause can be severed from an
agreement without invalidating the entire agreement. If the party
consent requirement is to be effectuated and future litigants, courts, and
arbitrators are to be given guidance, then the method for finding an
agreement's central purpose must implement the Texas approach of
asking whether the parties would have entered into the agreement
absent heightened judicial review.
III. PARTY INTENT SHOULD BE CENTRAL TO FINDING AN AGREEMENT'S
CENTRAL PURPOSE

This Part proposes that courts and arbitral tribunals analyze invalid
heightened judicial review clauses by inquiring whether the parties
would have entered into the arbitration agreement without the clause.
Part III.A sets out a proposed rule based on Texas's approach and adds
to it a rebuttable presumption that parties would not have agreed to
arbitrate without heightened judicial review. Part Ill.B highlights the
three primary benefits the proposed rule can provide: 1) stating a clear
rule that can guide future litigants, courts, and arbitrators; 2)
effectuating the party consent requirement; and 3) protecting the
legitimacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. Part HI.C
explains that the proposed rule and rebuttable presumption do not
conflict with the FAA's pro-arbitration policy. Finally, Part III.D
explains that in cases where arbitration is pending or ongoing, the
arbitrator, not the court, has the first right to decide on the arbitration
agreement's validity.
A. The ProposedRule and Rebuttable Presumption
Courts and arbitral tribunals should adopt the rule that, when faced
with an invalid heightened judicial review clause, the clause will be
severed and the remaining agreement enforced if the parties would have
entered into the agreement without the invalid clause. By investigating
96. Id. Armendariz and Hall Street are connected. When the Ninth Circuit first ruled in Hall
Street, it held, in an unpublished opinion, that the heightened judicial review clause was severable
based on the court's holding in Kyocera, which was the eventual progeny of Arnendariz. Hall St.
Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 03-35526, 2004 WL 2596020 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2004).
Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to adopt California's approach to
severability because Hall Street chose not to include the Ninth Circuit's severance ruling in its
request for certiorari. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 n.6 (2008).
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party intent, the court or arbitral tribunal places itself at the proverbial
negotiating table and asks what result would have occurred if the
Supreme Court had eliminated the possibility of heightened judicial
review prior to the agreement's formation. If the parties would have
consented to arbitrate even without heightened judicial review, then the
clause's invalidity should not invalidate the agreement. If the Court's
removal of the heightened judicial review clause prior to the
agreement's formation would have prevented the parties from
consenting to arbitrate, then the clause's invalidity must also invalidate
the agreement. This rule draws a clear and easily accessible link
between the invalid clause, party intent, and the agreement's central
purpose.
In theory, the rule is relatively straightforward as stated. In practice,
discerning party intent presents two key problems. First, it could
require litigants to gather a great deal of evidence that an opposing party
is holding. Determining whether the heightened judicial review clause
was central to the agreement's formation would require a thorough
examination of the agreement's negotiation phase. During negotiations,
parties have an incentive to only reveal a minimal amount of
information to each other. If one party reveals that it views a proposed
term as expendable early in the negotiation process, then that revelation
could seriously disadvantage that party's bargaining position as the
negotiation progresses. Often, the evidence needed to show that the
heightened judicial review clause was or was not central to the
agreement's formation would not be found in overt communications
between the parties. It is more likely to take the form of internal,
perhaps protected, communications between the parties and their
respective counsel. Consequently, the opposing party probably holds
most, if not all, of the necessary evidence. In court, this could lead to
protracted discovery processes. In arbitration, where discovery is often
limited,97 the parties may have trouble obtaining the evidence needed to
prove their case.
Second, discerning party intent could grant the finder of fact too
much discretion when interpreting the evidence. Boldly asking whether
the parties would have agreed to arbitrate absent a heightened judicial
review clause is a subjective inquiry. The approach asks the court or
arbitral tribunal to predict party conduct based on its reading of the
evidence.

97. See generally W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Contours of Arbitration Discovery,
67 ALA. LAW. 280 (2006) (analyzing the unique nature of the discovery process in arbitration
proceedings).
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To avoid these problems, courts and arbitral tribunals should
presume, subject to rebuttal, that parties would not have agreed to

arbitrate without the heightened judicial review clause.
The
presumption is largely justified by the fact that the presence of a
heightened judicial review clause in an arbitration agreement
demonstrates that the parties specially contemplated the clause. The

placing of a heightened judicial review clause in an arbitration
agreement is a unique event, especially when parties adopt the language
of model agreements offered by arbitration institutions. Any given
model arbitration clause can provide for, among other things, the
resolution of disputes by arbitration, the applicable institution and rules,
the scope of issues covered by the agreement, and the entering of an

arbitration award as judgment in any court with jurisdiction.98 One
notable absence from any institute's model arbitration agreement,

however, is a heightened judicial review clause. For example, not only
do the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) model clauses not

provide for heightened judicial review of the arbitration award, but the
AAA also, as amicus curiae in Hall Street, argued against the wisdom
99
of heightened judicial review.
The addition of heightened judicial review language to model
language demonstrates that the parties specially contemplated the
98. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES (Amended and Effective Sept. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440&printable=true
(outlining the procedural rules for
commercial arbitration, including procedures for large, complex commercial disputes);
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Amended and
Effective Mar. 1, 2008), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994&printable=true
(outlining the procedural rules for international dispute resolution); Chicago International Dispute
Resolution Association, Model Arbitration Clause or Separate Arbitration Agreement,
http://www.cidra.org/modelarb.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (providing a model arbitration
clause that includes the number of arbitrators, place of arbitration, and language to be used in
arbitral proceedings); INT'L CTR. FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION & PREVENTION, NONADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES (2007), available at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/O/
2007%20Arbitration%2ORules%20SlimJim.pdf (providing procedures to facilitate the conduct of
the arbitration process fairly); LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION
RULES (1998), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/lcia.arbitration.rules. 1998/portrait.pdf
(setting the arbitration rules for London courts for international arbitration); INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION (1998), available at http://www.jus.uio.nolm/icc
.arbitration.rules.1998/portrait.pdf (establishing the procedures for international commercial
arbitration); ARBITRATION INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION
RULES (2007),
available at http://www.sccinstitute.seL/upload/shared-files/regler/2007
_Arbitration_Rules eng.pdf (providing the procedures and rules for arbitration).
99. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Arbitration Ass'n in Support of Affirmance at 19-20,
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 06-989) (arguing that while
the FAA endorses party autonomy and flexibility, the FAA does not grant parties the power to
determine the applicable judicial review because it would be an unconstitutional delegation to
private parties of Congress' power to regulate courts' practice and procedure).
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clause's addition. Additional concerted effort was needed to tailor the
arbitration agreement so that both parties could be protected from a
poorly decided award. The heightened judicial review clause was
important enough to the parties for them to make the effort to
specifically include it in the agreement. This demonstrates, albeit not
conclusively, that one or both of the parties would likely have scrapped
the arbitration agreement and chosen to resolve their disputes in court
rather than arbitrate without the protection of the specially negotiated
heightened judicial review clause.
The proposed rebuttable
presumption embraces the unique nature of the heightened judicial
review clause and the protection it offers the parties.
B. The Rule's Three Major Benefits
The proposed rule has three major benefits. First, it limits court and
arbitrator discretion and, consequently, provides clearer guidance for
those confronted with heightened judicial review clauses. Second, it
effectuates the party consent requirement in arbitration law. Third, it
protects the legitimacy of arbitration by not unduly forcing unwilling
parties into arbitration.
1. The Rule Limits Arbitrator and Court Discretion and Leads to Clear
Guidance
The key weakness of the majority approach is that there is no clearly
stated method for finding the agreement's central purpose.
Consequently, courts and arbitral tribunals enjoy a considerable amount
of discretion and parties suffer from greatly diminished predictability
regarding their case's potential disposition. Without a clearly stated
method for finding an agreement's central purpose, parties are
disadvantaged in their case planning.
Parties that wish to pursue a dispute that is subject to an arbitration
agreement containing an invalid heightened judicial review clause must
choose one of a number of options before going forward. First, they
could initiate arbitration. This is the best option if they are relatively
certain that the arbitration agreement will be enforced by severing the
invalid heightened judicial review clause. Second, they could ignore
the arbitration clause and take their dispute directly to court. This is the
best option if they are relatively certain that their arbitration agreement
is now invalid. Third, they could renegotiate an arbitration agreement if
they still want to arbitrate but are relatively certain the agreement was
invalid. Fourth, they could negotiate a settlement if they felt unlikely to
prevail in either court or arbitration, but the calculus used to determine
the strength of their case would depend on the forum.
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Each of the above scenarios assumes that the parties' decisions are
guided by a clearly stated rule regarding the arbitration agreement's
validity. The law as it is, however, does not have a clearly stated rule.
If one party wishes to proceed with the dispute, it is uncertain exactly
what evidence must be presented to demonstrate whether the invalid
heightened judicial review clause is severable. It is also unclear who
bears the burden of proof. These uncertainties increase the parties'
costs by requiring more consultation with counsel and by increasing the
risk of the parties investing significant resources in an arbitration or a
court proceeding only to discover that they bet on the wrong forum. A
risk-averse or even risk-neutral party is likely to feel compelled to settle
its case instead of pursuing its dispute in an uncertain forum. The
strong desire to avoid pursuing the dispute could force the party that is
the least tolerant of risk to settle for less than it is legally entitled. The
lack of a clearly stated rule regarding invalid heightened judicial review
clauses promotes inefficiency by increasing costs and forcing cautious
parties into settling for less than they would be entitled.
The proposed rule avoids these problems. First, it clearly states that
the central purpose of a contract is to be determined by whether the
parties would have entered into the agreement absent the heightened
judicial review clause. From the outset, the parties know what they
need to prove to win their case and can plan their case strategy
accordingly. Second, the rule presumes that parties would not have
entered into the agreement without a heightened judicial review clause.
The burden of proof is placed on the party requesting that the invalid
clause be severed and the remaining agreement enforced. That party
knows that it will bear the lion's share of discovery costs as it tries to
build its case and can take that knowledge into account when planning
its strategy. The party that bears the burden can also consider the
likelihood of proving its case and compare the costs of proceeding to
the costs of settling. Knowing what is to be proven and who must prove
it promotes efficiency.
2. The Rule Effectuates the Party Consent Requirement in Arbitration
Law
The lack of a clearly stated method for finding the central purpose of
an agreement opens the door for courts and arbitral tribunals to
undervalue the requirement that parties must consent to arbitrate before
a valid arbitration agreement can exist. With very few exceptions,
arbitration's central tenet is that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate
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unless they have consented to arbitrate. 100 Parties that agree to
arbitrate, through their own free will, give up the courts' procedural
safeguards for the cost-effective advantages of arbitration. Arbitration
does not permit the same level of discovery as the courts; it has
significantly more relaxed evidence rules, 10 1 and after the holding in
Hall Street, its opportunity for judicial review is limited strictly to the
narrow grounds found in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.'1 2 Arbitration,
however, can be speedier, more flexible, and have greater finality and
confidentiality. 10 3 Giving up one's proverbial day in court is a
significant act, but an arbitration agreement reflects the parties' freewill
decision to forego court protections for the advantages of arbitration.
By not including party intent in their analysis of an agreement's
essence, courts and arbitral tribunals are free to infer the essence of the
agreement without considering to what the parties would have
consented. In this manner, the party consent requirement can be
ignored. If, on the other hand, party intent is the sole basis by which a
clause may be severed, then the only ground for enforcing the
arbitration agreement is party consent. If, after severing the invalid
heightened judicial review clause, the resulting arbitration agreement is
something to which the parties would have consented, a court or
arbitrator can infer consent on behalf of the parties. If the parties would
never have consented to arbitrate without heightened judicial review,
courts and arbitrators must acknowledge this fact and nullify their
agreement in its entirety. Thus, the party consent requirement retains its
primacy.
3. The Rule Protects Arbitration's Legitimacy by Not Unduly Forcing
Unwilling Parties to Arbitrate
The current approach allows courts and arbitrators to compel parties
to arbitrate under terms to which they would not have agreed. Doing so
may make parties reluctant to arbitrate in the future. This would be
unfortunate considering the strides that arbitration has made in building
its legitimacy in the United States.

100. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating that the "first principle" of arbitration prevents parties from being compelled to
arbitrate if they have not agreed to do so).
101. See BORN, supra note 55, at 81-93 (discussing evidentiary rules and the discovery
process in arbitration).
102. See supra Part L.A (discussing the Hall Street holding).
103. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 22-33 (4th ed. 2004).
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Arbitration, especially interstate arbitration, is a widely accepted
form of dispute resolution, but this has not always been the case. Prior
to the 1920s, courts and legislatures refused to effectuate arbitration
agreements or enforce arbitration awards based largely on the belief that
arbitral tribunals were less qualified than judges to decide legal
issues. 10 4 At the urging of the business community, Congress and state
legislatures took proactive measures to combat this suspicion by
enacting arbitration legislation that afforded arbitration agreements the

same protections as other forms of contract and provided for the
enforcement of arbitration awards. 10 5 The FAA, comparable state
statutes, and favorable Supreme Court rulings have allowed arbitration
to gain widespread acceptance. 106
Yet, factions of attorneys, journalists, and politicians continue to
view arbitration with suspicion. 107 Sometimes the suspicion is based on
lingering biases, such as the outdated notion that arbitral tribunals are
ill-equipped to decide complex legal and substantive issues. Other
times the suspicion is based on valid criticism, such as the use of
adhesion contracts to force unsophisticated parties to give up their right
8
10
to go to court, or that the lack of transparency in arbitration.

104. BORN, supra note 55, at 187-88.
105. Id. at 188.

106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Jayne Bryant Quinn, Editorial, Arbitration Favors Finns Over Investors,
WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008, at F01 (criticizing the fairness of arbitration panels with industry

representatives sitting on the panel); Rep. Linda T. Sdnchez, Letter to the Editor, Arbitrationor
Trial in Court Should Be a Fair Choice, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2008, at A16 (arguing that large
corporations with superior bargaining power have taken the choice whether to arbitrate or litigate

a dispute away from consumers, employees, and small businesses by requiring all disputes to go
to a private, secret forum picked by a corporation); Chris Serres, Arbitrary Concern for the
National Arbitration Forum, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 11, 2008, at B1 (noting that the

National Arbitration Forum has begun attracting attention from consumer advocates and legal
scholars for lopsided victory rates against consumers).
108. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 is an excellent example of the mix between valid
and reactionary public perception of arbitration. See Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007) (as forwarded by subcommittee to full committee by voice vote on July 15, 2008).
On one hand, the bill protects consumers from unwittingly waiving their right to court by
prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration agreements between consumers and businesses. H.R. 3010, §
4. Other nations, such as Sweden, have the same prohibition. 6 § Lag om skiljefhrfarande
(Svensk ftirfattningssamling [SFS] 1999:116) (Swed.) (English translation available at
http://www.sccinstitute.se/._upload/sharedfilesflagar/lagen-1999-eng.pdf). On the other hand,
the bill smacks of misplaced distrust regarding arbitral tribunals' independence and impartiality
by stripping from them any ability to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement. H.R.
3010, § 4. The bill states:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the validity or enforceability of an
agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing
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To avoid fostering negative public perception of arbitration, courts
and arbitral tribunals should make a concerted effort to honor the intent
of the parties when deciding whether to invalidate an arbitration
agreement containing a heightened judicial review clause. If a party
would not have consented to arbitrate without the protection of
heightened judicial review, then that party should not be forced to
arbitrate without it. To force a party into arbitration without what it
viewed as a central procedural protection could likely cause that party to
avoid arbitration agreements in the future, for fear that agreed upon
arbitration procedures would be vulnerable to substantial court and
arbitrator intervention and revision.
Arbitral tribunals should particularly loathe too-easily enforced
arbitration agreements that lack heightened judicial review. This could
foster a perception of jurisdiction-grabbing on the part of arbitrators. A
common, if slightly unfounded, criticism of arbitration relates to the forprofit nature of the arbitral process. According to the criticism,
arbitrators' and arbitration institutions' profits are maximized when the
arbitration runs its course and is concluded with a rendered award. If an
arbitration agreement is found to be invalid, then the case is cut short
and the profit potential may be limited. Therefore, arbitrators and
arbitration institutions have an economic incentive to validate
questionable arbitration agreements and compel parties to arbitrate.
This criticism is unfounded for a number of reasons, not the least being
that if an arbitrator is released from one case, she is able to take on
another, thereby continuing to maximize her profit. Regardless of
whether the criticism is well founded, it exists. Parties forced to
arbitrate under terms to which they would not have agreed upon could
seize onto the criticism that their consent was ignored to guarantee the
arbitrators' payday. Whether valid or not, this belief also runs the risk
of fanning the flames of public suspicion.
The proposed rule presents a clear and understandable approach to
invalid heightened judicial review clauses that places a premium on
such agreement.
Id. This provision flies in the face of well-established national and international legal principles
regarding circumstances when the arbitral tribunal has the first right to decide the validity of an
arbitration agreement. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995);
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 55, at 213-14; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
103, at 299-302; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 16(l)
(2006) ("The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement."); German Arbitration Act of
1997 § 1040(1), translated in MICHAEL BOHLER, THE GERMAN ARBITRATION ACT OF 1997:
TEXT AND NOTES 23 (1998) ("The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction and in this
connection on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.").
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party intent. By adopting this proposed rule, courts, and arbitrators in
particular, will help assure the parties that they are the most important
players in the process. This will help build on the substantial grounds
arbitration has made as a legitimate form of dispute resolution.
C. The Proposed Rule Does Not Conflict with the FAA's ProArbitration Policy
Federal and state courts recognize that the FAA embodies a federal
policy favoring arbitration and that "any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." 10 9 Courts,
like the Ohio Supreme Court in Ignazio, cite the pro-arbitration policy
1 10
as a reason for severing invalid heightened judicial review clauses.
As such, one could argue that the proposed rebuttable presumption runs
counter to the FAA's pro-arbitration policy by making it more difficult
to enforce arbitration agreements. This argument is misplaced. The
presumption can co-exist with the pro-arbitration policy, because the
Supreme Court invokes the policy in the context of an existing
agreement's scope and not, as is the case with severing invalid clauses,
the agreement's underlying validity. Briefly examining the Supreme
Court's invocations of the pro-arbitration policy demonstrates this point.
First, the Supreme Court has invoked the policy to compel arbitration
of claims when an arbitration agreement existed, but the claims were
stayed in federal court. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal
of a district court's stay of arbitration proceedings pending the
disposition of a parallel state court matter.'Il The district court meant
to avoid piecemeal resolution of the parties' dispute that would result
1 12
from sending the dispute simultaneously into arbitration and court.
Despite this laudable goal, the Supreme Court held that the FAA
embodied a federal policy to honor arbitration agreements and to send
113
disputes to arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.

109. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(explicitly adopting a federal pro-arbitration policy), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(l) (2006).
110. Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ohio 2007).
111. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19.
112. Id. at 7, 19-20.
113. Id. at 22. Likewise, the Court has invoked the policy to compel arbitration of claims
stayed in state courts. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Court compelled the arbitration
of state law claims, despite the fact it would create piecemeal and inefficient proceedings. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
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Second, the Supreme Court has invoked the pro-arbitration policy
when holding that the FAA pre-empts many state statutory and
procedural rules governing arbitration. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,
the United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme
Court's refusal to compel the arbitration of claims brought under a
California statute. 1 14 The Supreme Court held that the federal proarbitration policy justified the FAA's pre-emption of a California statute
prohibiting the arbitration of certain claims. 115
Similarly, in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that, on the basis of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy, an arbitrator could
ignore New York's prohibition against punitive damages in arbitration,
116
even when the parties chose New York law to govern the dispute.
Likewise, in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,the Court relied
on the FAA's pro-arbitration policy to pre-empt state laws requiring
questions of contract validity to be decided by state courts.1 17 In
Preston v. Ferrer, the Court also pre-empted the same rule relating to
1 18
state administrative agencies.
Third, the Supreme Court has invoked the pro-arbitration policy to
compel the arbitration of federal statutory claims that are meant to
protect the public. For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court compelled the arbitration of claims
under the Sherman Antitrust Act.1 19 Furthermore, in Green Tree
FinancialCorp. v. Randolph, the Court compelled arbitration of claims
under the Truth in Lending Act. 120 In Randolph, the Court noted the
pro-arbitration policy when rejecting Randolph's argument that the
prohibitively high cost of arbitrating would effectively prevent her from
vindicating her statutory rights. 121
The above cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's use of the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy to move parties quickly into arbitrationregardless of the practical effects on the parties-when a valid
arbitration agreement exists. That includes lifting stays of arbitration
proceedings, pre-empting state laws and procedure that restrict
arbitration, and compelling arbitration even when statutory rights are at
issue. However, the Supreme Court has not used the pro-arbitration
114.

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 15-16.
Mastrobouno v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1995).
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447-49 (2006).
Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987 (2008).

119.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-40 (1985).

120. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000).
121. Id. at 90-91.
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policy to settle the question of whether an arbitration agreement
becomes unenforceable when one of its clauses is invalidated. In terms
of arbitration agreements that contain invalid heightened judicial review
clauses, if a court finds that the parties would not have agreed to
arbitrate without the protection of a heightened judicial review clause,
then no previous use of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy demonstrates
122
how or why the policy could be used to save the agreement.
Therefore, a court or arbitral tribunal can presume an arbitration
agreement with an invalid heightened judicial review clause is null
without flying in the face of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy.
D. Determining "Who Decides"
The proposed rule raises the issue of who, the court or arbitral
tribunal, should first decide whether the invalid heightened judicial
review clause is severable. Perhaps the arbitral tribunal should stay its
proceedings and wait for a court to decide whether the arbitration
agreement is enforceable, or, perhaps the court should defer to the
arbitrator. Exploring First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan123 and
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle 124 provides a framework for
considering the issue.
In First Options, Manuel and Carol Kaplan owned an investment
company named MKI. 12 5 They, on behalf of MKI and not as
individuals, signed a debt work-out agreement with First Options of
Chicago, a firm that cleared trades on the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange. 12 6 The work out agreement contained an arbitration
agreement. 127 Later, when First Options tried to compel arbitration
only MKI, not the
against the Kaplans as individuals, they argued that
28
arbitrate.'
to
consented
had
individuals,
as
Kaplans
122. By specifically stating that doubts regarding the scope of arbitral issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration (and not doubts as to the validity of arbitration agreements), U.S.

law seems to more closely resemble the international arbitration principle of effective
interpretation (when two different interpretations of the same term can be reached, the
interpretation giving the term effect should be adopted) and not the principle of interpretation in
favorem validitatis (the allegation of a valid arbitration agreement should raise a presumption as
to its validity). See FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 55, at 257-61.
123. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).

124. Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 445.
125. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940.
126. Id. at940-41.
127. Id. at 941; see generally Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of

"Consent," 24 ARB. INT'L 199 (2008) (discussing the theoretical distinction in U.S. courts
between claims that nothing was ever agreed to and claims that the parties did agree to something,
but it is unclear exactly what).
128. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
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The Court found that before it could answer whether the Kaplans as
individuals were bound to arbitrate, it first had to decide whether the
parties intended to decide the question of who the parties to the
arbitration agreement were, or whether they intended that a court decide
the matter. 12 9 It found that under normal circumstances, doubts
concerning what the parties intended should be decided in favor of
arbitration; however, for an exceptional class of issues, the courts
should assume that parties intended the courts to decide. 130 According
to the Court, when parties agree to arbitrate, they most likely
contemplated that an arbitrator may decide the scope of the issues that
fall within their agreement. 13 1 In contrast, the question of who should
decide the existence of an arbitration agreement, however, is one that
the Court viewed as "arcane" and unlikely to have been considered by
the parties. 132 Therefore, the Court held that courts should assume that
parties wanted those questions to be decided by courts unless the parties
present "clear and unmistakable" evidence that they intended
otherwise.133 Underlying the distinction is the Court's desire to avoid
forcing "unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would
' 134
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide."
First Options suggests that disputes regarding the existence of an
arbitration agreement are for the courts to decide (unless the parties
have made their contrary intent clear), and disputes regarding the scope
of the arbitration agreement are for the arbitrators to decide. 135 This
reading of First Options is supported by the Court's holding in Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle. 136 In Bazzle, the contracts between a
commercial lender and its customers contained arbitration agreements

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 943.
Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 945; see also William W. Park, The Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to Determine

Jurisdiction, in

INT'L

COUNCIL

FOR

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION,

INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO BASICS?, at 55, 125-46 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007)
(stating that in general, "jurisdictional differences have been manipulated into the realm of
substantive questions whose resolution the parties are deemed to have given to the arbitrators").
134. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
135. The issue is not whether the arbitrator has the exclusive right to decide, but whether the
arbitrator has the first right to decide. Under U.S. law, no issue is ever exclusively for the
arbitrator to decide. The very existence of the grounds for vacatur in sections 10 and 11 of the
FAA demonstrates that parties may always appeal to the courts for review of an arbitrator's
decision. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2006). The Court, however, has made it clear that an
arbitrator's decision will be given great deference and that the grounds for vacatur are 1)
exceedingly narrow and 2) after Hall Street, limited to those found in the FAA.
136. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 445 (2003).
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that called for the arbitration of contract-related disputes.1 37 When the
Bazzles, South Carolina residents, attempted to initiate a class-wide
arbitration, Green Tree claimed it had only agreed to arbitrate with its
customers as individuals and not as a class. 138 The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreements should be
interpreted under South Carolina law as allowing class-wide
arbitrations. 139 Green Tree appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which held that it could not decide whether the arbitration
agreements allowed class-wide arbitrations because resolution of the
issue hinged on contractual interpretation and it should be assumed that
the parties intended arbitrators to interpret their agreement. 140 The
Court supported its holding by citing First Options and again
distinguished between two categories of issues: one category in which
courts should assume the parties intended arbitrators to decide and one
category in which courts should assume the parties intended courts to
decide. 14 1 Thus, courts should assume that parties intended courts to
decide "gateway" questions regarding whether the parties "agreed to
arbitrate a matter" or "whether the parties have a valid arbitration
agreement at all." 142 Conversely, courts should assume that parties
intended arbitrators to decide disputes over the "kind143of arbitration
proceeding" or those that involve contract interpretation.
The issue of who should decide whether an invalid heightened
judicial review clause can be severed from the arbitration agreement in
which it sits does not clearly fall within any of the distinctions marked
by FirstOptions or Bazzle. On one hand, the issue is one to be resolved
by interpreting the parties' agreements (regardless of whether the rule
proposed in this Article is adopted). This falls into the category of
issues that parties are assumed to have left to the arbitrator. On the
other hand, resolving the question strikes to the validity of the
arbitration agreement. If a court or arbitrator decides that the parties
would not have agreed to arbitrate without a heightened judicial review
clause, then the entire arbitration agreement is invalid. This falls into
the category of issues in which courts should assume that the parties
intended a judge to decide.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at448.
Id. at449.
Id. at 450.
Id. at451-52.
Id.at452-53.
Id. at452.
Id.at452-53.
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Resolving the question of "who decides" the fate of arbitration
agreements with invalid heightened judicial review clauses is beyond
the scope of this Article. Proper resolution would require a much more
lengthy examination of First Options and its progeny, including Bazzle.
The question is mentioned for the purpose of identifying the issue and
suggesting an analytical starting point for its resolution.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's invalidation of heightened judicial review
clauses has left the validity of existing arbitration agreements uncertain.
This uncertainty extends to countless agreements in almost every
jurisdiction covering any category of dispute. The issue of the
agreements' validity is currently facing courts and arbitrators and will
continue to come up as parties invoke currently dormant arbitration
agreements.
Federal courts will apply state law and find that the invalid clauses
can be severed if doing so does not vitiate the agreement's central
purpose. The majority approach to this question, however, does not
clearly state a method for finding an agreement's central purpose.
Therefore, if left unchanged, treatment of invalid heightened judicial
review clauses will continue to be conclusory and provide little insight
for future litigants, courts, or arbitral tribunals.
Courts and arbitral tribunals can avoid these problems by adopting
the Texas courts' approach and inquire into whether the parties would
have agreed to arbitrate without the heightened judicial review clause.
If the parties would have agreed to arbitrate, then the clause can be
severed and the remaining agreement enforced.
To promote
predictability, courts and arbitral tribunals should presume that the
parties would not have entered into the agreement without the
heightened judicial review clause. This rebuttable presumption is based
on the notion that a heightened judicial review clause is not a common
addition to most arbitration clauses and, therefore, evidences its
particular importance to the parties.
The proposed rule co-exists with FAA's pro-arbitration policy,
because the policy is used to remove roadblocks from arbitrations under
existing agreements. The Court has not invoked the pro-arbitration
policy to breathe life back into agreements that have been invalidated.
Additionally, when arbitration is ongoing, parties, judges, and
arbitrators should be aware of the uncertainty of who has primary
authority, the judge or arbitrator, to decide the validity of the arbitration
agreement.
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Considering the scope of the problem created by the ruling in Hall
Street, courts and arbitral tribunals should act quickly to employ an
easily accessible approach that reduces discretion, leads to predictable
outcomes, preserves the fundamental party intent requirement, and
protects arbitration's legitimacy as a dispute resolution mechanism.
Inquiring into whether the parties would have entered into the
arbitration agreement absent the heightened judicial review clause
accomplishes all of those goals.

